PEACE REPORT

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

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THE MARCH OF EVENTS

Russia's long series of nuclear blasts—particularly its dirty monster of more than 30 megatons—cast more than a cloud of radioactivity over the world. It added new fury to the arms race, hurt chances of stepping down the Cold War.

On Berlin, neither side appears ready to push to the far edge of the brink, nor does either side yet appear ready to negotiate a reasonable settlement.

Khrushchev, although he has withdrawn his ultimatum to sign a peace treaty with East Germany by the end of 1961, evidently still has not cleared up certain points of vital interest to the West. He has said West Berlin will remain a free city and Western rights of access will be guaranteed. But he has also suggested that West Berlin might be guaranteed by Allied, United Nations and *Soviet* troops, a plan which the West would reject. Moreover, he said that the West must negotiate access rights with East Germany. An explicit statement that the treaty itself with East Germany would guarantee Western rights in West Berlin and access rights to it would go far in clearing the air.

For its part, the West appears diplomatically immobilized. President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan seem to be able to agree on little more than defending the *status quo,* and President De Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer appear against negotiations altogether. Illustrative of the confusion was this exchange between Senator Humphrey and Secretary of State Rusk:

Humphrey, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told a group in Warsaw that U.S. officials are giving Poland's Rapacki plan for a demilitarized zone in Central Europe "very, very thoughtful and serious study and consideration." Rusk, in Washington, promptly rejected any plan for military disengagement in Central Europe as a solution to the crisis over Berlin and Germany. Since such a plan would include not only East and West Germany, but also Poland, Czechoslovakia and perhaps Hungary, it could conceivably roll back the Iron Curtain.

Though the United Nations is on the verge of bankruptcy and has been operating without a secretary general, there is still much life in it. The Soviet Union appears less difficult than had been expected about restoring leadership to the Secretariat. It seemed to agree to the selection of U Thant of Burma as secretary general and drop its demand for a three-man directorate, each with veto power. The Soviet proposed either four, six or seven assistant secretaries. If U Thant has the top post, the four assistants would be from the U.S., U.S.S.R., Africa and Latin America. With six, the Soviets would add one from Eastern Europe and one from Western Europe, and with seven, another Asian.

The U.S. preferred five assistant secretaries—the same as the Soviet four plus one West European. This the Soviet Union refused to accept. When the U.S. hinted that it might go along with the four-man proposal, a howl went up among the West Europeans.

Some observers were surprised the U.S. did not choose the seven-man proposal. This clearly would not be a troika. (The six-man plan could have come out looking something like a double-troika.) It would

be well balanced geographically. Also, by having an Asian assistant secretary, it should definitely establish that the secretary general, although he would be an Asian in this case, should not in any sense consider himself the representative of Asia in the Secretariat, but only as the highest U.N. executive officer.

If a satisfactory agreement is reached on some kind of "cabinet" for the secretary general, it could mark a significant forward step in the growth of the U.N. Even if the "cabinet" has only advisory capacity, it could strengthen the secretary general's hand in a crisis by backing him up. Such a "cabinet" might also make it more likely that the Security Council or General Assembly would have sufficient confidence in the Secretariat to entrust certain difficult tasks to it. Hammarskjold himself must have felt this need, as he proposed before his death an expansion in the number of assistant secretaries.

A broad range of other problems also faces the U.N.: The ceasefire in Katanga remains shaky; funds for the Congo operation are exhausted; a long debate is expected in an effort to get disarmament negotiations under way again; a bitter discussion of the question of Red Chinese admission is now certain.

Within the U.S., meanwhile, a feeling of disillusion with the U.N. appears to be growing as it becomes increasingly apparent that the West no longer dominates the organization. Governor of Montana Donald G. Nutter said that he would not proclaim United Nations Day (October 24) in his state until the U.N. became "something other than a forum for the enemies of this country." Even stronger reactions may be expected should the U.N. admit Red China, which many expect by next year at the latest.

Disappointment with the U.N. appears also to be attracting new support to plans for strengthening the Atlantic community. The article "For a Concert of Free Nations," by Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs*, has drawn wide comment. Says Fulbright: "While the United Nations will remain a symbol of our aspirations, we can hope at the most, as things stand, to build a viable community of the Free World."

More specifically, Fulbright suggests: "A realistic 'concert of free nations' might be expected to consist of an 'inner community' of the North Atlantic nations and an 'outer community' embracing much or all of the non-Communist world.

"The North Atlantic nations represent an almost-existing community and, because they do, they can press forward in the development of supranational institutions. Because their community is fragile, these institutions for the time being should be functional rather than federal, piecemeal rather than general. In practice, this would mean the further development of NATO as an organ of political and economic cooperation, the vigorous implementation of the O.E.C.D. and the expansion of existing organs of European integration, with Great Britain, Canada and the Unit- States moving toward full participation."

Observers with a stronger U.N. orientation agreed that a more robust Atlantic community might somewhat improve the West's position *vis a vis* the Communists. However, they pointed out that only in a world organization could the problems of war and peace be dealt with ultimately. While those with this view admitted the present shortcomings of the U.N., they felt that changes could be made in the U.N. to make it more effective. Also, they had doubts that many of the "outside" nations would want to join a group controlled by the "colonial" powers.

Speaking at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev blasted Albania's top Communist Enver Hoxha for being a "Stalinist" and for having established a "personality cult," both heinous sins in Khrushchevian communism. But this line was rejected by Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh and North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung. Since Albania has remained ideologically close to Red China, Khrushchev's attack was considered to have been an indirect way of hitting at China. For such a dispute to be aired publicly probably means that it is serious. If so, it may leave the Communist world fragmented in at least three parts: Russia and its satellites, China plus North Vietnam, North Korea and Albania, and "revisionist" Yugoslavia, which is in everybody's doghouse.

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A Psychologist's Cure For the Arms Race

By Charles E. Osgood

A leading psychologist suggests a revolutionary way to reverse the arms race without jeopardizing U. S. security

A usually intelligent raccoon trying to get out from under a stinging shower will persistently bang its head against a locked door that *used to be* open, completely ignoring free passageways to left and right. The raccoon has become accustomed to escaping through this particular door, and in a state of panic can think of no better response than the habitual one.

Just like that raccoon, nations today are lumbering down the one habitual path to "security" — bigger and better weapons — gathering as they go tensions that make it less and less likely they will recognize and use better alternatives.

Why does "peace through strength" no longer lead to real security? By its very nature, the balance of terror cannot provide security. Both sides feel themselves to be "walking on atomic eggs"; the consequences of a mistake, of an error of judgment, become incalculable. Moreover, it is difficult to maintain just the right degree of threat — not so little that the enemy is encouraged to attack out of over-confidence nor so much that he strikes out of fear. Thus we do not have the stably poised balance of deterrence that mathematicians and chess players are fond of envisaging; rather it is a highly unstable, teetering imbalance in which either side may believe itself so far below as to strike out defensively or so far above as to strike out offensively. Let us look at the variety of possible ways a nuclear war could start:

• ***Escalation.*** A small war (in Germany, for instance) might grow into a big one.

• ***Preventive war.*** Although this possibility now appears remote, it must be realized that the longer a deterrent stalemate continues, the greater become the internal pressures to escape from the intolerable situation in one way or another.

• ***Pre-emptive war.*** If at some time a nuclear war seems to be inevitable, either side may choose what appears to be the lesser risk of attacking first — convinced that the other is about to reach the same conclusion.

• ***Accidental war.*** Despite the elaborate safeguards for both men and materials, there is always some chance of a human mistake or mechanical failure.

• ***War through madness.*** There are people with suicidal tendencies who, in destroying themselves, have no compunction about destroying others. The stresses of prolonged mutual deterrence can be expected to increase the numbers of such people, in high places as well as low.

• ***War triggered by other nuclear powers.*** The probabilities of accidental war should increase geometrically with the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons. It is estimated that by 1970 at least 10 countries will have nuclear weapons — unless controls are instituted. Just as the Colt 45 brought big men and little men to common stature in the days of the Old West, so will nuclear weapons become "the great equalizer" among nations. A Cuba armed with nuclear weapons and delivery systems *could* devastate the U. S. as completely as could Russia.

It is evident, then, that increased armament no longer means greater security, and that like the raccoon, we are banging our heads on a door that used to be open. Nuclear power is all offense and no defense. The policy of "peace through strength" appears to be leading the world toward a thermonuclear war that could develop in a variety of ways and in which everybody would lose.

Where can we find a more promising path? Unilateral disarmament, while it might bring the world closer to peace, is not acceptable to the majority in any of the powers. The reason that the pacifists have had so little effect with their criticisms of present policy is that they offer believable threats but no believable solutions. Psychologists have learned that threatening people with hell-fire *without offering them any acceptable solution* does more to reinforce complacency than to shake it. People try to avoid and forget information about fearful things over which they have no control; at the same time they welcome information that reassures them and reduces their anxieties.

For the time being there is no practical alternative to maintaining our nuclear strength. But it is essential that these nuclear weapons be designed primarily for retaliation so that they will appear less aggressive

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Dr. Osgood is director of the Institute of Communications Research at the University of Illinois. He is also president-elect of the American Psychological Association and chairman of the A.P.A. Committee on Psychology in National and International Affairs. This article is based on his monograph, "Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction: A Key to Initiative in Foreign Policy," soon to be published by Doubleday in a book called "The Liberal Papers."

to the opponent. They should be viewed, not only as a deterrent, but as a security base from which to take limited risks. And we should keep no more nuclear weapons than are necessary to deter aggression. The trouble, however, is that competitive military psychology results not in the minimum needed for effective deterrence but in the progressively expanding see-saw of the arms race.

'Obvious' Answer

The obvious answer to the nuclear war threat would seem to be negotiations leading to a treaty for disarmament. But for 16 years efforts in this direction have failed. It is unfortunate but true that the history of negotiations reveals an inverse relation between urgency and achievement — the greater the need for disarmament, the smaller the prospect for successful negotiation. This is because both sides bring to the conference table precisely those attitudes and beliefs that generated the tensions and arms race to begin with.

The goal of negotiations, of course, is to reach a neutral solution of benefit to both sides. The difficulty is that even if such a neutral solution could be found, one side or even both might view it as being advantageous to the other. In times of tension, perceptions vary greatly. The objectively impassive face of a man in a picket line looks "threatening" to a representative of management, but "determined" to a union leader. The same American overseas bases that we see as "defensive" the Russians see as "offensive." The Soviets want nuclear disarmament first and inspection second (they have a closed society's traditional fear of espionage); Americans want inspection first and disarmament second (they have an open society's traditional fear of secrecy).

Underlying these difficulties in negotiation is the building up on both sides of a bogey man conception of the other. In every past war, we have built the enemy into a bogey man — Simon Legree in the Civil War, the murderous Santa Anna in the Mexican War, the Kaiser of World War I, the cruel, bucktoothed Jap of World War II — even though not long before the war, and soon after, he may have been our friend and ally. There may happen to be elements of truth in these images, Hitler being a case in point, but the process is irrational.

Once the bogey man conception has been built up, a double standard of national morality goes into effect. Exactly the same behavior is moral if *we* do it but immoral if *they* do it. Why? Because different motives are expected in Good and Bad Guys. It is legitimate for us to spy on them with a U-2 in order to defend ourselves against treacherous surprise attack; but since they view themselves as peace-loving, not treacherous, our action looks aggressive to them. A neutralist like Nehru may be labeled pro-Communist and even school desegregation in the South is viewed by some who don't like it as Communist inspired.

Then how can we reduce international tension enough to lessen the chances of nuclear war and increase the chances of fruitful negotiation, while at the same time preserving our freedom and security? Strangely enough, the arms race itself may hold the secret.

The arms race generates *increased* tensions. When one power steps up the tempo, the other reciprocates, and this gradual process continues spiraling into a blow-up. What would happen if one power began a series of moves stepping *down* tensions and inviting the other to reciprocate? This possibility has led to the creation of a concept that I have given the long but descriptive title, "Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction." For short, we can call it by the word that happens to be formed from its initials, GRIT — and that is just what it would take to carry it out.

Based on Deeds

If President Kennedy is truly determined "to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race but to a peace race," as he told the U.N. General Assembly recently, the GRIT concept offers new hope as a means of getting the race under way. GRIT is based on deeds rather than words, but with the deeds so carefully graduated in risk that at no time would national security be endangered. The deeds, always carried out unilaterally after considerable advance notice, are expected to be reciprocated by deeds of the other side. The manner of the other side's reciprocation will affect the further deeds of the initiator.

Imagine, beginning on Thursday, March 15, that you learn through your newspaper of this series of events:

March 15 — The U. S. announces that on May 1 it will make public all medical information it has gathered concerning man-in-space. Reciprocation is invited from all nations. We also spell out the general nature of our new policy of carrying out a series of unilateral tension-reducing acts in the hope and expectation of reciprocal actions by other nations.

May 1 — As we release the medical information, we announce that on June 1 we will denuclearize our bases in Japan, and we invite U.N., Russian and Communist Chinese inspection. Reciprocation is invited but not specified. We reiterate our general policy.

June 1 — We carry out the denuclearization of our Japanese bases. The U.N. sends inspectors; Russia and China decline to do so.

June 15 — We announce that we are making technicians and professionals in various fields available to the U.N. for work in the Congo and other areas; reciprocation from other "have" nations is invited and our general policy is again stressed. Nehru urges Russia to join the project.

June 20 — The U.S.S.R., without reference to the U. S. initiatives, announces it will make medical information from its man-in-space projects available to the U.N.

June 27 — The Soviet announces that certain new areas of its territory are being opened to Americans im-

mediately and challenges the U. S. to open more of its areas.

July 1 — The U. S. announces that on August 1 the DEW Line (early warning system) will be made bi-directional (warning of our flights toward Russia as well as vice versa), and we invite the Russians to "plug in." (Experts have said this is technically feasible. It emphasizes our reliance on retaliation rather than a first-strike strategy; if we have no intention of surprise attack, there is no reason why this should not be done.) Reciprocation in kind is invited.

July 15 — The U. S. announces that the entire territory of the U. S., exclusive of militarily restricted areas, will be open to Russians beginning August 15.

August 1 — The U. S. announces that it is ready at any time to receive Russian delegates to instruct them on procedures of plugging in to the DEW Line. The Russians reply that they will take the matter under consideration.

August 10 — Russia announces that on September 1 it will reduce its troops in East Germany by one-third; it invites reciprocation in the form of denuclearization of West Germany and reduction of conventional NATO forces there. It also agrees to join the Congo aid program.

August 15 — The U. S. announces that Russians may now travel freely in the U. S. It also announces a new China policy for the U.N. General Assembly session to begin the following month: If Communist China will agree to uphold the United Nations Charter and accept Taiwan as an independent state, thus ending the civil war, the U. S. will urge a two-China policy, with both Formosa and Communist China in the Assembly and Peking in the Security Council.

September 1 — The Soviet Union announces it is carrying out its announced reduction by one-third of its forces in East Germany. It again invites reciprocation in the form of denuclearization of West Germany and reduction of NATO conventional forces.

September 15 — NATO announces it will denuclearize West Germany but says that no reduction in its conventional forces is being planned at this time. NATO invites reciprocation through removal of the wall the Communists built through Berlin.

Thus, hopefully, little step by little step, tensions would gradually be decreased, lessening the chances of war and improving prospects for profitable negotiation.

Does this sound like something out of *Fantasy and Science Fiction?* In such detail, it certainly does. This sequence, of course, is purely imaginary. The difficult problems of communication and counter communication, misunderstanding and clarification, probing and holding off, are not dealt with. However, some of the dynamics of the process are illustrated. For one thing, it is apparent that much of the reciprocation appears as initiation by the opponent, inviting *our* reciprocation. This is obviously desirable, as long as the unilateral initiations are in the right direction, but it means that we must be flexible and quick-witted in estimating our reactions and initiatives.

'i drink because . . .'

A prominent weekly news magazine made a poll of its correspondents recently to find out how they spent a typical week. This was the reply from a Washington correspondent:

i dealt with the enormous problem of berlin. it is a bad situation there and so i talked about war, nuclear holocaust and the possibility that 90 or 100 million americans might be blown up before the diplomats could settle it to our advantage. this depressed me. i spent most of my week, therefore, building a big shelter in my backyard in georgetown. it is furnished with early american furniture and made of lead and is only big enough for me. my wife is building her own shelter which is being done in modern style. aside from that i didn't do much this week except drink. i drink because of the enormous problem of berlin.

To work out such a series of unilateral acts would be a very complex task requiring specialists in many fields. However, I am confident that if only one per cent out of every defense dollar were put into an intensive effort to design and evaluate programs of tension-reducing steps, effective and flexible programs could be devised. Is this too much to invest in the search for alternatives to thermonuclear war?

Many effective techniques of GRIT could be expected to develop as the nations acted and reacted to each other's tension-reducing deeds. However, I believe our studies have already indicated GRIT's general principles:

(1) *Unilateral deeds must be accompanied by clear invitations to the opponent to reciprocate.* In the recent history of Soviet-American relations there have been many instances of unilateral, tension-reducing actions on both sides, but they have been largely abortive — because they were not announced in advance as part of a consistent policy, were not explicit as to expected reciprocation and were therefore never disentangled from the Cold War. One such example was the Soviet signing of an Austrian peace treaty and withdrawal of its forces from that country in 1955. A summit meeting and an era of good feeling followed — until disagreement over Germany once again sent Cold War tensions upward.

(2) *Unilateral deeds must be announced in advance, widely publicized and carried out on schedule regardless of whether or not the opponent reciprocates.* The announcement of a first unilateral deed, particularly since it would not be very risky, would likely be met by cries of "propaganda" from the other side. Even after its execution it would probably be called a Cold War "trick." But after execution of the next — and the next — and the next — it would be more and more difficult for the opponent to dismiss the deeds as propaganda. The bogey man conception of their enemy (ourselves) inevitably would begin to break down.

(3) *Unilateral deeds must not endanger our "heartland" or reduce our capacity for retaliation if the enemy should attack us.* If each side retains its capacity for near-annihilation of the other, it can feel less nervous about carrying out tension-reducing steps. As tension is successfully lowered, chances will improve for fruitful negotiations on fully-controlled disarmament.

(4) *Unilateral deeds must be accompanied by firmness in all areas.* This may sound contradictory, but it is no more so than the wise parent who encourages spontaneity in his child in certain situations without letting down the bars all over the house. Unilateral actions should be accompanied by the warning that any encroachment would be resisted firmly, and firm resistance should be made if encroachments actually occurred.

(5) *Unilateral deeds, insofar as possible, should involve transfer of authority from national to international institutions.* Technological developments in communications, trans-

(*Continued on page* 12)

EDITORIAL

Goldwater and the Neanderthals

We have come through many ages since the Neanderthals lived in the Old Stone Age, perhaps a million years ago. Just 16 years ago, with no warning or preparation, we were thrust into a new age, the Nuclear-Space Age. Since most of us were born and raised in the pre-nuclear era (and *all* the world's leaders were), it is hardly surprising that our ways of thinking are still mostly pre-nuclear. If we are to survive, we must shift our attitudes to take account of the new facts of life. Let us call Neanderthals those who have not yet been able to adapt themselves, for their thinking might as well be of the Stone Age for all the value it has in the Nuclear-Space Age.

America's leading Neanderthal, and symbol for all the others, is Barry Goldwater, senator from Arizona. He is, in fact, running for president on a straight Neanderthal program. Domestically, he may be trying to repeal only the twentieth century; internationally, his policies would seem destined to repeal the human race.

Consider once again the monstrous powderkeg we are sitting on. If all the explosive power in the weapons now stockpiled were transformed into its equivalent in TNT and spread evenly over the area of our country, all of us would be wading in TNT well above our ankles. In this situation, to pursue the picture further, we see Senator Goldwater in his Stetson hat and cowboy boots bravely striding through the blanket of TNT ready to let go with his flamethrower at anybody who gets in his way.

The senator says that the U.S. should "declare officially that it is our purpose to win the Cold War, not merely wage it in the hope of attaining a standoff." He states our purpose should be "complete victory over the tyrannical forces of international communism." On disarmament, he says, "I have no faith in disarmament. There is always one s.o.b. in the world who won't go along with it." (Goldwater himself is one who won't go along with disarmament.)

Recently *The New York Times Magazine* asked Goldwater to explain how he would go about winning the Cold War. In his article ("How to Win the Cold War," September 16, 1961), Goldwater reiterates in a dozen different ways this theme: "Every time we have stood up to the Russians, they have backed down. Our trouble is we haven't stood up to them often enough." But nowhere does he state how we could achieve total victory over the Communists. He does not say we could "win" a thermonuclear war, nor does he say we could provoke a revolution within the Soviet Union, nor does he suggest any other alternative to coexistence. The simple fact is that there *is* no alternative to coexistence (except non-existence), and Goldwater's war cry about "complete victory" over communism is a complete fraud.

Before the cries of "appeasement" go up, let us state that we are in favor of resisting communism. We have our way of life, we like it and if we want to keep it intact we had better keep our deterrents handy. But let us keep cool heads and calm nerves and try to figure out a safe way to live in the Nuclear-Space Age.

Goldwater tells us: "We can assume *nothing* where the Communists are concerned. We can trust *nothing* that the Communists say." We submit that there is at least one matter on which we can believe Communists unquestioningly. This is when they say: "We do not want to die; we want to live."

Let us assume Barry Goldwater and Nikita Khrushchev somehow happened to be in the same canoe floating down a rapids. Not far ahead is a huge waterfall with lots of jagged rocks at the bottom. Unless they paddle together fast they will go over to certain death.

GOLDWATER: Start paddling, Commie, or we're doomed!

KHRUSHCHEV: Ha! You want me to paddle first, you exploiter!

GOLDWATER: I'll paddle all right, you chiseler, but I know that even if you do put your paddle in the water you'll be faking it!

KHRUSHCHEV: I'll take a stroke if you'll take a stroke, you imperialist! (He takes a small stroke.)

GOLDWATER: Okay, you gangster! (He takes a stroke. To give the story an unlikely happy ending, they then both paddle rapidly to shore, reaching it just at the waterfall's brink. Other troubles begin then, but at least they are alive.)

In similar fashion, since they need to pull together to get out of a tight spot, East and West should be able to reach agreements on arms control, disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes. Whether they do will depend on whether or not the Neanderthals — on both sides of the Iron Curtain — can be kept from controlling the course of events.

The New U. S. Proposals For Freedom From War

By Marion H. McVitty

A longtime analyst of disarmament problems urges that Soviet intentions be put to the test through negotiations

One thing about disarmament is certain: There won't be any unless both the United States and the Soviet Union sincerely want general and complete disarmament. Since the real intention of these two major powers is, indeed, the primary factor, it can be said that we have lately seen a 50 per cent increase in disarmament prospects. For the first time, the United States government seems to have put forward a program for general and complete disarmament which it genuinely hopes will succeed.

In the past this government has made comprehensive disarmament proposals which were ill-prepared, which lacked support both inside and outside the administration and which could be made safely only because the U.S.S.R. was certain to reject them.

The current American plan has been developed during months of careful study in the Disarmament Section of the Department of State. John J. McCloy and his associates have shown that they, themselves, are convinced that their program is feasible because it includes all the essential elements of an international security system which can be applied with equal justice to all nations.

The president of the United States came, himself, to the United Nations at the opening of the Sixteenth Assembly and endorsed the new U. S. proposal in forthright terms. "We in the United States," he said, "have labored this year with a new urgency . . . to find an approach to disarmament which would be so far-reaching yet realistic, so mutually balanced and beneficial, that it could be accepted by every nation." The president, too, indicated clearly that he knew disarmament requires a framework of enforceable world law and a U.N. Peace Force to insure compliance and to protect disarmed nations.

The United States Senate and House of Representatives by very large majorities have just created the new statutory Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament. The terms of reference of that agency are so broad as to encompass all possible aspects of disarmament and of an international security system capable of maintaining just and lasting peace. The Congress has authorized funds and machinery to make the new agency effective.

Contradiction to Defense?

Thus, today, even as the crisis over Berlin has necessitated a military build-up in this country, the president, the State Department and the Congress have demonstrated a new faith and a new purpose in the cause of disarmament. Is all this a contradiction to increased defense spending and increased military preparedness made necessary by recent events? In his "State of the Union Message," President Kennedy reminded us that the American eagle has two claws—in one he holds a sheaf of arrows, in the other an olive branch. The power to protect our national interests is also the power to negotiate peace with honor.

If prospects for achieving a warless world are 50 per cent increased because the foregoing assessment of United States intentions is correct, what about the other 50 per cent, which depends upon the intentions of Russia? In view of the Soviet's resumption of nuclear tests, its brinkmanship in Berlin and its efforts to gain a veto over all U.N. activities, most people in this country probably rate Soviet sincerity about disarmament at zero. Despite all these discouraging signs, the U.S.S.R. still claims a willingness to negotiate general and complete disarmament. *Nothing that has occurred so far has put this Soviet claim to the test.*

Certain fashionable cliches have become axioms which persuade the public mind to despair. "The Russians refuse to permit inspection." "The Russians will never give up the veto." "If you can't get Soviet agreement even to a nuclear test ban treaty, how can you expect their agreement to anything more?" "If the Russians break agreements on Berlin, they can't be trusted to keep disarmament agreements."

Those who consider such "truths" to be "self-evident" have fallen victim to our own propaganda. They have subscribed blindly to the proposition that the United States has done everything possible to achieve disarmament and that the U.S.S.R. has

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Mrs. McVitty is editor of The Independent Observer, *which analyzes United Nations affairs.*

raised every possible obstacle to prevent it.

We now know that the U. S. has not yet done everything possible to achieve disarmament, because it has just offered new, more comprehensive proposals, and because it has set up an agency to improve its proposals and its ability to negotiate them. Even now our plans are not perfect; it would be surprising if they were. We have added several new dimensions to the grand design, but complex problems remain to be solved as the details are elaborated.

Differences of opinion still appear to exist within our administration as to whether our major effort should be placed on negotiating the comprehensive plan, or upon achieving certain preliminary steps before committing this country to all the stages of the full objective. The program just put forward still postpones until the second stage the peace forces and peacekeeping machinery which are required to *match* arms reductions at every step from the *outset*. The proposal is silent as to the means that might be used to determine what police forces shall remain in the end to each nation for preserving internal order.

U.S. in Earnest

The residue of contradictions and ambiguities detectable in the new U. S. proposals will not be attributed by Americans to any lack of earnestness. Rather, these shortcomings can be expected to yield to further constructive thought.

Obstacles to disarmament raised by the Russians have been almost universally considered in this country to be direct evidence of bad faith. The common thought is that the Soviet Union strews the path of disarmament with unreasonable obstructions to progress because it does not want disarmament of any kind.

Certainly there is no proof that the U.S.S.R. really wants to achieve general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, their behavior in disarmament negotiations does not prove that they don't. Some of the obstacles they have raised have come to be exaggerated in the course of tedious years of reporting on negative results. At the same time some of those obstacles do represent real problems, mutual problems, as difficult for the United States to surmount as for the U.S.S.R.

It is not true that the Soviet Union refuses to accept inspection. They have elaborated plans for an increasing degree of inspection over each succeeding phase of disarmament, and have insisted that they will agree to unlimited inspection and control over total disarmament. The hard core of this problem must be faced by both sides. How can nations in the early stages of disarmament, while they still retain weapons and forces for their own defense, permit international inspectors to verify what they have left? Even an open society like ours is not so open as to have no military secrets of strategic importance. There are potential answers to these questions, but they have not yet been sufficiently explored by either major power.

It is not true that the U.S.S.R. will never give up the veto. The Soviet Union has proposed a control organ which, "except in certain specific cases," would make its decisions "on substantive matters by a two-thirds majority, and on procedural matters by a simple majority." In a recent interview with C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times*, Khrushchev explained that the U.S.S.R. would not insist on a "troika" to administer the control organ, but only on a "troika" to govern the use of an international peace force. Control of this force remains a problem for both sides, since every nation will be concerned that the power of an international force in a disarmed world shall not be misused to the detriment of any state. Needless to say, a "troika" is not the best, nor is it the only, answer to this question. Others remain to be supplied.

Soviet rejection of a nuclear test ban treaty became likely two years ago when the U.S.S.R. made it abundantly clear that it was suspicious of any kind of partial disarmament. Recent Soviet documents reiterate the reasons given in 1959 for their preference for general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Government contends that, "The advantage of general and complete disarmament over all other plans for preserving peace is, first and foremost, that it is the easiest to put into practice." According to the Soviets, general and complete disarmament "permits the elimination of many of the obstacles which have arisen when merely partial measures have been under consideration and when individual states have feared that the application of such measures might destroy the balance of forces and be prejudicial to their security." They suggest further "that the conclusion of such an agreement will also greatly simplify the exercise of international control over disarmament measures, since, if complete disarmament is achieved, states will have no reason for concealing anything from one another." Finally, the Russians state the obvious, "As long as armaments and armed forces, even reduced, restricted, or cut down, remain in existence, the possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict . . . will still be there."

Part-Way Problems

Many non-Soviet students of disarmament have also been concerned about the risks inherent in partial disarmament measures. Such measures, however small they may be, must rely for controls upon inspection alone. Should a violation be detected by the inspectorate, such plans cannot insure that the violation would be halted or compliance enforced upon a nation determined to cheat. Abrogation of the treaty would be the only recourse of other signatories. The resulting disillusionment would make any new arms control effort impossible for years thereafter.

As a disarmament program proceeds, effective enforcement measures can be introduced only when national force levels are low enough to make practical an international peace force superior to any national army. For years it has been questionable as to whether any nation would have sufficient confidence in any disarmament measure safeguarded by inspection only. Recent U.S. proposals indicate clearly that this country would be unwilling to reduce armaments very far without international agencies to *enforce* the agreement. Since peacekeeping machinery must be devised sooner or later if succeeding steps are to be taken, both sides might well explore how real security may be built into the disarmament program from the start.

Whatever reasonable doubts one may have as to the motivations of the opposite side, it would surely be perverse to refuse to discuss with the U.S.S.R. the full objective which the U. S. seeks, simply because the Soviets decline to discuss something less.

It is precisely because treaty and diplomatic agreements can be broken with impunity, as Berlin threatens to demonstrate, that disarmament and world peace cannot be founded on mutual trust between nations. President Kennedy in his U.N. speech

LUCE TALK

"But if Americans took precautions against fallout (from a thermonuclear attack) the mortality could drop sharply. About five million people, less than three per cent of the population, would die."

***Life*, September 15, 1961**

"Given between 30 minutes' and an hour's warning of a 150-city thermonuclear attack, an adequate national system of fallout shelters might well cut the death rate from 160 million to 85 million."

***Time*, October 20, 1961**

called for "world-wide law and law enforcement." This would mean no nation need rely on the word of another. Each would be relying upon an international security system which could not be defied by any other state or group of states.

The real intentions of the U.S.S.R. on the issue of disarmament are at present unknown. They can now be tested against genuine U.S. proposals designed to achieve the stated goal. Until that test has been made and a reliable verdict returned, it behooves us to reserve judgment as to Soviet motives. This country has nothing to lose, and much to gain, by an honest endeavor to negotiate successfully.

What About U.S.?

United States leaders have outlined at last a real alternative to the hopeless choice between suicide in an atomic war or surrender to Soviet communism. At this moment the question is not, "What about the sincerity of the Soviets?" but "What about the support of the American people?"

The Soviet Union has risen to its present state of power on the wings of an idea, passionately believed. Its dynamism is generated by a vision of communism established throughout a world ruled by them.

This can be countered only by an idea transcending theirs, pursued with surpassing fervor. A new and more compelling dynamism can be generated by the vision of a democratic form of world order, providing disarmament, security and a just peace, ruled by law, established with the consent of all peoples.

Americans who see that vision and let it go by default because of defeatism or apathy will be selling the birthright of humanity—dirt cheap.

An Answer to Our Helter-Skelter Shelter Policy:

The Five Per Cent Community Shelter Plan

By W. H. Ferry

The do-it-yourself advice of the administration's civil defense program, faithfully propagandized in *Life* and other national magazines, is questionable on every count. The heart of the program turns out to be the home-made, one-family shelter, the impracticality of which must be clear to anyone who thinks for a moment about where American families in fact spend their time. Unless an enemy attack were conveniently launched at, say, six o'clock Sunday morning, the home-made shelter is likely to prove to be useful only as an oversize underground pantry.

What is needed is not the basement workshop approach but a practical common effort based on democratic theory and aimed at equitable treatment of all citizens.

Perhaps I can use the city of Santa Barbara, where I live, to exemplify such a plan. This city is less than 100 miles downwind from Vandenberg Air Force Base, which is doubtless a prime target.

The population of the Santa Barbara area is about 60,000. This is the number that would have to be taken care of under an ideal civil defense plan.

The cost of public shelters for this number, however, is probably prohibitive. Because of the aimlessness of civil defense up to now, no per person cost estimate is available for the land purchase, building and stocking of typical public fallout shelters. Perhaps a cost of $1,000 per person is neither too high nor ridiculously low, at least in Santa Barbara, where the price of land and labor is high.

So it might cost $60 million to construct and stock sufficient public shelters for the whole population of this area. No one, neither the federal government nor local taxpayers, is likely to be willing to pay out this amount. Some more modest and realistic plan must be found.

Mr. Ferry, vice president of the Fund for the Republic and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, writes here as an individual.

A statistician recently pointed out that even in a relatively well-prepared community—one with the usual scattering of private and public shelters—only about five per cent of the population could expect to find protection against fire and fallout in the event of nuclear war. The remainder would be too far away, at school or work or at the supermarket. He also pointed out that the lucky five per cent would have their problems with "eccentric neighbors." They might, for example, have to shoot their way into the shelters, whether their own or public. Who is to decide what members of the public may not use public shelters? Another peril is that those excluded might be so enraged as to try to cut off the water and air supplies from the outside, so the shelter would have to be completely self-sustaining.

Such considerations indicate the irrationality of present policies and the need for a minimal and equitable shelter program. The proposal ventured here (still using Santa Barbara as the example) is that the community should, by ordinance and bond issue, decide to build and equip enough shelter space for five per cent of its population—3,000 people. At $1,000 per person the cost would be $3,000,000. The shelter would be equipped and stocked for at least four weeks and perhaps for six weeks, since no one really has any idea what the effects of modern nuclear war will be.

A certain number of amenities would be provided in the shelter, for an important element of this proposal is the following: *3,000 Santa Barbara residents will be required to live at all times in the shelter, but not, of course, the same 3,000 all the time.* Each group of 3,000 might be chosen by lot; or the names might be taken serially out of the phone book; the petit jury selection system may be used; or whole neighborhoods might be put into the shelter. Each batch of 3,000 would be required to stay in the shelter at least a week, 24 hours

a day. Longer or shorter periods might be decided on; but a week would seem to be a tolerable length of time. Every 20 weeks, therefore, each local resident would spend a week, day-and-night, in the shelter with a random sampling of his neighbors. The two weeks usually given for vacations could be used in this way. During this period no one would be allowed to enter or leave. No communication with the outside would be permitted. Each draft of 3,000 would include doctors and nurses for medical emergencies. There would be no rule against private shelters, but possession of one would not excuse the owner from service in the communal shelter every 20 weeks.

These latter stipulations may seem unnecessary and inhumane. They are, on the contrary, one means of dealing with the problem of "eccentric neighbors" referred to above. They are necessary if the principal advantages of the proposal are to be realized. These advantages are:

The plan is equitable and democratic. Everyone in the community will be treated alike. One man's chances are as good as his neighbor's of being in the shelter if war occurs. There is no possibility of favoritism being shown. Everyone would be compelled to serve his stint in the shelter, whether he cared to do so or not.

The arrangements are rational, since they guarantee that at least five per cent of the residents of the Santa Barbara area will survive at least four or six weeks of a nuclear war unless, of course, there should be the misfortune of a nuclear weapon exploding nearby.

The plan is economical and efficient. Local taxpayers would be putting up a lot of money—$3 million to build the shelter—but they will know that their investment is being used 24 hours a day, and in fact would themselves be compelled to such use two weeks each year.

It remains now only to be seen what community will first adopt a civil defense scheme enjoying all of these benefits and none of the drawbacks of the present helter-skelter policies.

As a new service to our readers, *War/Peace Report* will order any book reviewed or listed in its pages, including all books reviewed or listed since its first issue in April. All orders must be accompanied by a check.

REVIEW SECTION

POSTWAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL. By Bernard G. Bechhoefer. 600 pp. The Brookings Institution. $8.75.

By W. A. Higinbotham

A little over three years ago, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States finally started serious negotiations on a specific disarmament step — suspension of nuclear weapons tests. The start was auspicious, as agreement was speedily reached on the technical aspects of inspection. But negotiating a treaty proved to be much more difficult. The talks dragged on and on until the Soviets resumed testing on September 1, making the whole effort seem to have been for naught. The natural reaction is to conclude that the U.S.S.R. does not in fact want disarmament and that our only recourse is to build fallout shelters and prepare for the worst. This prospect is certainly most unattractive and I hope the assumption on which it is based is not in fact true. Even with the best shelter program one can envisage, a major war will be a major catastrophe for the Communist world as well as for us.

A few years ago I met a Russian who has been intimately involved in the disarmament negotiations since 1950. The first thing he said to me was that he could prove that the United States did not want to reach agreement on any arms control measures. With little encouragement he proceeded to document his case. I must confess that it sounded pretty convincing. And furthermore, when I checked up on the facts, I found that he had quoted them correctly. Although it would appear from a casual reading of the press that the U.S.S.R. always blocks every effort to make progress on disarmament, the fact is that American policy has also been vacillating and ambiguous. While both East and West have made constructive proposals, unhappily both have also placed major obstacles in the way of agreement.

This is a good time for those of us who are seriously concerned for the future of our planet to try to understand the issues and the recent history of the disarmament talks. The subject of arms control is very complex and the record of the negotiations is both extensive and confusing. Bechhoefer's book is an excellent review and analysis of what has transpired.

Immediately after Hiroshima and the end of World War II, there was a pause in policy making, followed by a great surge of activity in 1946 when the Baruch plan was formulated, presented to the United Nations and debated. The Soviets refused to accept it and the negotiations slowed to a halt. For a period of several years very little happened and even less thought was given to the subject in official circles. Mr. Bechhoefer was one of two people in the whole country who remained active. And since his official association with disarmament extended from 1946 to 1958, his opportunity to observe what went on is unique. He is also able to view the proceedings with great detachment.

Long, Long Debate

I cannot pretend that this is an easy book to read. A truly fantastic amount of official record has been analyzed and summarized and placed in context with the changing state of the world. Much of the text consists of direct quotes from official documents and statements of public officials, which have been astutely selected to present all the important moves. It seems to me to be very thorough, very accurate and very fair to all those who have participated in this long, long debate. Nor is Mr. Bechhoefer afraid to comment on the proceedings. His comments are not loud and dogmatic but quiet and sensible and in my mind deserve respect.

After reading "Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control" I feel that the Soviet resumption of testing, while regrettable, does not signal the end of disarmament possibilities and I am more convinced than ever that our country must make an even greater effort to formulate policies in the disarmament field and to seek mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets and the rest of the nations of the world.

Dr. Higinbotham, who worked on the Manhattan District Project during World War II, has been head of the Instrumentation Division of Brookhaven National Laboratory at Upton, N. Y., since 1952. He has also served as consultant to the U. S. government on defense problems and was technical consultant to the U. S. delegation at the East-West conference on measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack held in Geneva in 1958.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Disarm by Regions

To the Editor:

Prof. Louis B. Sohn's territorial disarmament proposal (see *War/Peace Report*, April, p. 9, and October, pp. 4-5) introduces a useful new idea — perhaps one that would satisfy the U.S.S.R. But might there not be an obstacle to Soviet acceptance in the first critical step, when each nation must declare a later-to-be-verified inventory of all its materiel?

The Soviets have always jealously guarded their military secrecy, perhaps out of the fear that when all the cards were laid on the table it would turn out that while they hold all the kings, we hold all the aces, and that somewhere in the disarmament process we might use our aces to take their kings.

Prof. Sohn has mentioned similar proposals, privately circulated by Dr. Melvin Mooney, a New Jersey research physicist. The Mooney proposals have this advantage over Sohn's: they respect Soviet desire for secrecy as much as Western insistence on inspection. No nation needs to disclose anything. There is no "moment of truth"; yet there is inspection.

Security is absolute under the Mooney plan because each nation disarms *itself*, territory by territory. Inspectors enter a territory only *after* it is disarmed. They see nothing because, if the job has been done, there is nothing to see.

Dr. Mooney assumes a gradual political, legal and military strengthening of the U.N. while gradual disarmament is being achieved. He proposes:

- Each nation would divide its land into, say, 20 areas of approximately equal military value. Each nation would be able to choose the size and shape of each area and combine geographically separated properties.
- Each nation would clearly outline its 20 areas and announce the number of each.
- When all area boundaries have been established to the satisfaction of every nation, one area number is chosen by chance. Let us suppose that Area 8 is chosen first.
- U. N. Inspectors would then speed to the Area 8 of every nation to surround it and stand guard against removal of any troops or materiel.
- Each nation would then completely demilitarize its Area 8 without the presence of alien inspectors. All troops stationed there would be demobilized, except, possibly, high-ranking officers. Atomic bombs would be disassembled, their fissionable material to be turned over to the strengthened U.N. for peaceful, income-producing purposes; ammunition would be detonated; military factories and research centers would be converted to peaceful pursuits. Purely defensive fixed fortifications and radar detection units could be retained with normal personnel. When each nation has completed demilitarization of Area 8, it would announce its readiness for inspection. U.N. inspectors would then make a thorough survey and maintain continuous checks against remilitarization.

Legal and moral forces and social science techniques could aid inspection. Nations might agree to make the hiding of "hardware"—even under orders—a personal crime; U.N. investigators, arresting officers, prosecutors, courts and prisons would deal with offenders. U.N. broadcasts might explain the program and urge citizens to cooperate. Rewards and safeguards for informers could be written into the agreement.

Complete disarmament would necessarily be slow. If, at any stage, for any reason, the program were to break down, the U.N. inspectors could be removed from cleared areas and the countries permitted to redistribute their remaining forces.

If detection of submarines proved technically difficult under the plan, submarine disarmament could be handled as a separate, final disarmament stage engineered by U.N. sea and shore forces.

As for the People's Republic of China, it should be possible to gain its consent to the plan as part of a package deal, which might include famine relief, medical or economic aid, and possibly U.N. membership after satisfactory disarmament of one or more areas.

Another problem might be that American atom - weaponed planes would temporarily have to be grounded, which the U. S. would not consent to. To make it safe to ground them, a temporary "hostages" exchange could be utilized, i.e., "visits" of selected high-ranking American military and political leaders to Russia and of Russian military and political leaders to the United States. If this sounds primitive, so is war.

BETTY KINDLEBERGER STONE
Bernardsville, N. J.

EDITOR'S NOTE: In an article, "Region-by-Region Disarmament," in the June 26, 1961, issue of *The New Republic*, David R. Inglis, a physicist at the Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago, says, "The proposal has had several independent origins: Professor Louis Sohn and his colleagues in Cambridge, Massachusetts; and in less detail by Academician Alexandrov, director of the Atomic Energy Institute in Moscow, and Dr. Melvin Mooney in New York. (Perhaps it should be called the 'Sohn - Alexandrov - Mooney Plan.')" Inglis also says, "As a general approach, this 'randomized region-by-region plan with prior inventory,' as proposed by Professor Sohn, seems so superior to earlier proposals as to open new doors to practical consideration of disarmament."

WAR/PEACE REPORT invites letters commenting on matters in its field, although it reserves the right to shorten them because of space limitations.

Peace ACTION For the Month

Don't miss a two-part television series being prepared by "CBS Reports" under the title, "The Balance of Terror." Parts I and II, respectively, will be called, "In Case of War" and "Can We Disarm?" The two one-hour shows, which CBS says "will pull no punches," are expected to be on Thursday nights between 10 and 11 p.m. E.S.T. during the second half of November, although the exact dates had not been set at press time. Part II will include appearances of Philip Noel-Baker, Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, Jerome B. Wiesner, Jerome Frank and a group of Russian scientists.

Why not invite in a group of friends to watch the show and follow it with a discussion? And you may be moved to write your reactions to the program to President Kennedy, your senators and your representative.

Psychologist's Cure . . .

(Continued from page 5)

portation, weaponry and other forms of human activity have made some form of world authority not only feasible but indispensable for survival in the nuclear age. Therefore our unilateral initiatives should encourage the trend in this direction.

(6) *Unilateral deeds should foster democratic ways of life and discourage totalitarianism.* Our initiatives can encourage the fundamentals of a free way of life, including higher standards of living, increased educational opportunity and freer flow of information.

Objections Certain

There will certainly be strong objections to such a policy. Most of them, I contend, would stem from the bogey man conception of the enemy. Many people will argue that *any* unilateral act designed to reduce tentions would be interpreted by the Russians as a sign of weakness and, given their despotic drive toward world communism, would encourage them to encroach further on the Free World. I cannot deny this as a possibility, even though I consider their motives for survival to be strong. But if this is their inherent nature, then we had better make sure of it now. At least we would have made a sincere effort to test their intentions, and the risk involved should be more than offset by a gain in favorable world opinion.

If, on the other hand, we discover that the Russians are more like ourselves than bogey men, that they are as eager to reduce the chances of nuclear war as we are, that the men in the Kremlin are also susceptible to pressure from both within and without, then we will have made a tremendous breakthrough toward peace.

The greatest risk of all is to continue — like the panic-stricken raccoon beating its head against the door that used to be open — to seek security through ever-greater nuclear armaments. We can maintain enough strength to deter aggression while at the same time we explore this new approach of graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction. Through GRIT we may be able to avoid the cosmic irony of having two of the most civilized nations on earth drive each other to mutual destruction because of their mutually threatening conceptions of each other — without ever having tested the validity of the conceptions.

Thoughts From My Shelter

Come, let us shout for joy; the world is not dead.
Though the bombs be big and the hour late,
brave men are still free!
What is this war that's like none before it
That man should return like a beast to his cave?
What is our purpose? What kind of a world
Can we hope may emerge from the fallout and rubble?
Forgive us, O God, for failing to heed Thee
For neglecting our neighbors and harboring hates.
Instill in our hearts Thy love for all peoples.
Let our goal be One World with freedom and justice.

Charles B. Dayton

PEACE FOR CHRISTMAS

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